Separation of dev/test/production environments is the structural defense against compromised developer-site implants reaching flight builds and ATLO.

Separation of SDR development environments from production deployment limits cross-contamination from compromised toolchains and out-of-tree modules.

Separation of development/testing/production environments is relevant to limiting a compromised collaborator lateral movement toward production, governing isolation rather than actively defending the collaborator-access vector.

Separation of ATLO/test/production environments is the structural defense against the cross-enclave bridges and shared storage IA-0012 exploits.

Separation of development/testing/production environments is relevant to limiting cross-environment contamination if adversary-staged artefacts reach operator environments, governing isolation rather than defending the adversary-side staging.

Separation of dev/test/production environments limits adversary lateral movement from a compromised dev account into FSW build artefacts.

Separation of development environments from test and production directly mitigates this technique's harvest of dev-environment intelligence.