System Owner/User Discovery
Description
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information. On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)
Mapped SPARTA techniques
No techniques mapped to this control.
Cross-framework references
Relationships published by the source frameworks themselves, reproduced here with attribution. They are not SafeMode Space mappings and carry no confidence rating of ours.
Countered by 31 in MITRE D3FEND (Defensive Techniques)
- D3-ABPIApplication-based Process Isolation
- D3-CFContent Filtering
- D3-CMContent Modification
- D3-CQContent Quarantine
- D3-DFDecoy File
- D3-DIData Inventory
- D3-DTPDomain Trust Policy
- D3-EALExecutable Allowlisting
- D3-EDLExecutable Denylisting
- D3-FAFile Analysis
- D3-FEFile Encryption
- D3-FEVFile Eviction
- D3-FIMFile Integrity Monitoring
- D3-HBPIHardware-based Process Isolation
- D3-HRHost Reboot
- D3-HSHost Shutdown
- D3-KBPIKernel-based Process Isolation
- D3-LFPLocal File Permissions
- D3-PLAProcess Lineage Analysis
- D3-PSProcess Suspension
- D3-PSAProcess Spawn Analysis
- D3-PSEPProcess Segment Execution Prevention
- D3-PSMDProcess Self-Modification Detection
- D3-PTProcess Termination
- D3-RDRestore Database
- D3-RFRestore File
- D3-RFAMRemote File Access Mediation
- D3-SAORSegment Address Offset Randomization
- D3-SCASystem Call Analysis
- D3-SCFSystem Call Filtering
- D3-WSAMWeb Session Access Mediation
Cite as SafeMode Space, mitre-attack-enterprise T1033.