Trusted Relationship
Description
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers) In Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.(Citation: Office 365 Delegated Administration)
Mapped SPARTA techniques
8 techniques
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Crosslink-based access from a compromised neighboring spacecraft is the orbital instance of T1199 'Trusted Relationship' — the neighbor is a trusted peer (often a constellation/swarm partner) and the crosslink relationship grants access without a separate auth challenge.
A hosted payload has a trust relationship with the host bus (shared infrastructure, partition boundaries assumed to be effective); compromising the payload to attack the host is exactly T1199 'Trusted Relationship' applied to the payload-to-bus boundary.
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Compromising the host spacecraft to attack a hosted payload is the inverse-direction trusted-relationship abuse (host has trusted access to the payload partition); T1199 'Trusted Relationship' covers this cross-direction at the same conceptual level as IA-0006.
Cross-framework references
Relationships published by the source frameworks themselves, reproduced here with attribution. They are not SafeMode Space mappings and carry no confidence rating of ours.
Countered by 11 in MITRE D3FEND (Defensive Techniques)
- D3-APCAApplication Protocol Command Analysis
- D3-CAAConnection Attempt Analysis
- D3-CSPPClient-server Payload Profiling
- D3-NTCDNetwork Traffic Community Deviation
- D3-NTFNetwork Traffic Filtering
- D3-NTSANetwork Traffic Signature Analysis
- D3-PHDURAPer Host Download-Upload Ratio Analysis
- D3-PMADProtocol Metadata Anomaly Detection
- D3-RTSDRemote Terminal Session Detection
- D3-STSession Termination
- D3-UGLPAUser Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis
Cite as SafeMode Space, mitre-attack-enterprise T1199.