AppCert DLLs
Parent: T1546
Description
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateProcessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code>. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.
Mapped SPARTA techniques
No techniques mapped to this control.
Cross-framework references
Relationships published by the source frameworks themselves, reproduced here with attribution. They are not SafeMode Space mappings and carry no confidence rating of ours.
Countered by 19 in MITRE D3FEND (Defensive Techniques)
- D3-CFContent Filtering
- D3-CIConfiguration Inventory
- D3-CMContent Modification
- D3-CQContent Quarantine
- D3-DFDecoy File
- D3-EALExecutable Allowlisting
- D3-EDLExecutable Denylisting
- D3-FAFile Analysis
- D3-FEFile Encryption
- D3-FEVFile Eviction
- D3-FIMFile Integrity Monitoring
- D3-HBPIHardware-based Process Isolation
- D3-LFPLocal File Permissions
- D3-PSAProcess Spawn Analysis
- D3-RCRestore Configuration
- D3-RFRestore File
- D3-RFAMRemote File Access Mediation
- D3-SCASystem Call Analysis
- D3-SCFSystem Call Filtering
Cite as SafeMode Space, mitre-attack-enterprise T1546.009.