AppInit DLLs
Parent: T1546
Description
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)
Mapped SPARTA techniques
No techniques mapped to this control.
Cross-framework references
Relationships published by the source frameworks themselves, reproduced here with attribution. They are not SafeMode Space mappings and carry no confidence rating of ours.
Countered by 19 in MITRE D3FEND (Defensive Techniques)
- D3-CFContent Filtering
- D3-CIConfiguration Inventory
- D3-CMContent Modification
- D3-CQContent Quarantine
- D3-DFDecoy File
- D3-EALExecutable Allowlisting
- D3-EDLExecutable Denylisting
- D3-FAFile Analysis
- D3-FEFile Encryption
- D3-FEVFile Eviction
- D3-FIMFile Integrity Monitoring
- D3-HBPIHardware-based Process Isolation
- D3-LFPLocal File Permissions
- D3-PSAProcess Spawn Analysis
- D3-RCRestore Configuration
- D3-RFRestore File
- D3-RFAMRemote File Access Mediation
- D3-SCASystem Call Analysis
- D3-SCFSystem Call Filtering
Cite as SafeMode Space, mitre-attack-enterprise T1546.010.