MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise
T1621

Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Description

Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users. Adversaries in possession of credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)

Mapped SPARTA techniques

No techniques mapped to this control.

Cross-framework references

Relationships published by the source frameworks themselves, reproduced here with attribution. They are not SafeMode Space mappings and carry no confidence rating of ours.

Cite as SafeMode Space, mitre-attack-enterprise T1621.

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.