Cyber-Safe State Function

Disabling fault management is met head-on by MI-DCO-02; this practice covers the same function from the design side, requiring it be built securely, which reduces but does not close the disable path.

Subverting protections via safe mode works because safe mode is designed for recovery rather than for security. The practice requires that fault management and safe mode operations be designed securely, which is the direct answer to the technique.

Exploiting reduced protections during safe mode is the execution-side statement of the same defect, and a securely designed safe mode is what removes the reduction the technique depends on.

Unauthorized access during safe mode is the access-side statement of the same defect. A cyber-safe state is one that does not relax authentication when it degrades function.

Monitoring for safe-mode indicators is reconnaissance that exists only because safe mode is a softer target. A secure safe-mode design removes the value of the observation without preventing it, which is governance rather than interdiction.