Art. 80(3)
Mapped SPARTA techniques (26)
Techniques referencing this article
Payload data and metadata (timestamps, calibration coefficients, quality flags) require 80(3)'s integrity categorization — the rationale clause 'the need to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability of information' explicitly extends to data products.
Art. 80(3)'s information categorization is domain-relevant to interception (it drives crypto policy), but categorization itself does not interdict the interception.
Art. 80(3)'s information categorization is domain-relevant to downlink exfiltration (it drives crypto policy), but categorization itself does not interdict the exfiltration.
Art. 80(3)'s information categorization is domain-relevant to theft (it drives encryption policy), but categorization itself does not interdict the exfiltration.
Spacecraft design information (avionics architecture, ICDs, SBOMs, AIT travelers) is exactly what 80(3) requires the operator to categorize by confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability needs.
Flight/ground software details (RTOS versions, command handlers, crypto libraries, patch mechanisms) require the confidentiality categorization 80(3) places on operator information assets.
Firmware images, bitstreams, and secure-boot settings are sensitive operator-held artifacts that 80(3)'s information-security categorization must cover.
Crypto algorithm/key documentation is high-confidentiality operator information that 80(3) requires to be categorized accordingly.
Bus topology, message IDs, schedule tables, and harness pinouts are high-confidentiality design artifacts requiring 80(3)'s information-security categorization.
Thermal control system internals (TMM models, heater maps, autonomy rules) are operator-held artifacts whose disclosure reveals stress points; 80(3) places confidentiality categorization on this information.
GNC stack details (control laws, estimator design, propulsion plume keep-out zones) are sensitive design artifacts that 80(3)'s confidentiality categorization must cover; loss of effective technical control of the space mission turns on protecting this data.
Payload ICDs reveal addresses, message IDs, gateway locations, and crypto-posture differences with the bus — high-confidentiality operator artifacts within 80(3)'s categorization scope.
EPS topology, MPPT algorithms, BMS limits, and load-shed priorities are sensitive design artifacts that 80(3)'s confidentiality categorization must cover.
FDIR/autonomy/safing materials (fault trees, FMEAs, autonomy rule tables, safe-mode entry/exit criteria) are high-confidentiality artifacts essential to mission resilience — within 80(3)'s information-security categorization scope.
Even though some descriptors (NORAD/COSPAR) are public, operational descriptors (pass windows, staffing patterns, ground-network affiliations) are operator-controlled information that 80(3) requires to be categorized for confidentiality.
CONOPS overviews, daily/weekly activity rhythms, ground pass schedules, and contingency playbooks are operator-controlled operational descriptors whose disclosure cascades into timing-attack capability — within 80(3)'s information categorization scope.
Comm posture details (frequency allocations, link budgets, antenna characteristics, station geometries) are operator-controlled artifacts that 80(3) categorizes for confidentiality.
RF-equipment specifics (antenna types, transponder behavior, modem settings) are sensitive operator-held artifacts requiring 80(3)'s confidentiality categorization.
Telecommand framing, authentication scheme details, command-dictionary formats, and timetag rules are highly sensitive operator artifacts within 80(3)'s confidentiality categorization scope.
Mission-specific channel configurations (carrier plans, burst structures, gateway locations) are operator-controlled artifacts within 80(3)'s scope.
Operator-controlled launch artifacts (range telemetry configurations, integrator touchpoints, internal launch schedules beyond public manifest) are within 80(3)'s categorization scope.
Flight Termination System architecture (authority chains, cryptographic protections, arming interlocks) is high-confidentiality operator/range information within 80(3)'s scope.
Art. 80(3)'s information categorization is domain-relevant to downlink eavesdropping (it drives crypto policy), but categorization itself does not interdict the reconnaissance.
Source trees, SBOMs, CI/CD configs, and code-signing workflows are operator-held information artifacts within 80(3)'s confidentiality categorization scope.
Test-tool inventories, fuzzer corpora, and coverage thresholds are operator-held artifacts whose disclosure reveals untested attack surfaces — 80(3)'s categorization applies.
Mission CONOPS, mode logic, and operational constraints are operator-controlled artifacts; while some elements are public, internal documents (algorithms, calibration methods, contingency CONOPS) are within 80(3)'s confidentiality categorization scope.