Annex 12.1.1
Mapped SPARTA techniques (31)
Techniques referencing this article
Training datasets and reference labels for security-monitoring models are mission-critical information assets whose classification level drives integrity and access controls.
Boot-stage code and pre-OS images are top-classification assets whose classification governs the strict storage and integrity controls that prevent malicious modification.
Boot ROM images and bootloader keys are top-classification assets; their classification governs the strict storage and access controls that prevent the pre-runtime manipulation this technique requires.
Boot images and pre-OS code are top-classification assets whose handling and integrity controls determine whether attacker modification is feasible at all.
Payload data, raw frames, Level-0 streams and metadata are mission-critical information assets whose classification level governs handling and integrity controls; in-place modification is precisely the leakage/integrity threat classification protects against.
Training datasets and reference labels are mission-critical information assets; their classification level drives the storage, access and integrity controls that constrain poisoning paths.
Mission traffic in transit (payload products, housekeeping, command/ack exchanges) is classified information; the asset-classification obligation drives the encryption and link-protection decisions that resist interception offline reconstruction.
Uplink content (commands, table uploads, file transfers) is classified information assets; classification level drives the confidentiality controls that resist uplink interception.
Real-time telemetry, recorder playbacks and payload products are mission-critical information assets; the asset-classification obligation drives the encryption and link-protection decisions that determine whether downlink intercept yields decodable content.
Development artefacts (source, test vectors, configuration data) are mission-critical information assets whose classification level governs storage and access controls.
Mission data is the principal target of theft attacks; the asset-classification obligation is the foundational control that drives the encryption, access and storage controls determining whether theft is feasible at all.
Boot ROMs and early-init configuration are top-classification assets; their classification governs the strict storage and access controls that prevent malicious modification at the source.
Cryptographic key material is the highest-classification asset the entity holds; its classification and the controls that flow from it determine whether key acquisition is possible at all.
ICDs, block diagrams, SBOMs and AIT travelers are the precise category of mission-critical information assets that must receive a classification level under the asset-classification framework so that downstream handling and access controls can be calibrated to their sensitivity.
Source code and stripped flight images are mission-critical information assets requiring classification so that storage, replication and sharing inherit the protection appropriate to crown-jewel software.
Firmware images and bootloader configuration are mission-critical assets whose classification level drives the storage, transmission and sharing controls that determine whether reconnaissance can recover them at all.
Cryptographic algorithm details, key types and key lifecycles are top-classification assets under any plausible asset-classification framework, which is the lever that drives strict need-to-know storage and handling.
Bus-protocol details (1553/SpaceWire timings, addressing, redundancy schemes) are mission-engineering assets; classifying them drives the handling and access-control controls that constrain bus reconnaissance.
Thermal architecture envelopes, set-points and survival heater configuration are engineering-asset content whose classification governs storage and disclosure constraints.
GNC algorithms, control gains and stability-margin documentation are mission-critical assets whose classification level drives strict storage and dissemination controls.
Payload command sets, operating modes and data-paths are sensitive mission assets whose classification drives the control regime that constrains payload-reconnaissance leakage.
EPS topology, autonomy thresholds and battery configuration are engineering assets whose classification determines whether their exposure to recon is permitted by the asset framework.
FDIR/safing logic and fault trees are crown-jewel mission assets; their classification level drives the strict need-to-know controls that prevent recon-driven prediction of the spacecraft's safe-mode behaviour.
Frequency plans, link-budget tables, modulation and FEC parameters are mission-critical communications assets; their classification level drives the storage and dissemination controls that determine the recon surface for an adversary's RF profile of the mission.
Comms-equipment topology and capability documents are mission-critical assets; their classification drives the controls that prevent extraction by a recon adversary.
TC framing, packet structures and authentication-field definitions are crown-jewel command-system assets whose classification determines who can reconstruct the commanding interface.
Credentials, tokens and key material are top-classification assets whose handling controls determine whether the recon adversary can ever harvest them in the first place.
Flight-termination architecture, command-destruct authority and autonomous-flight-safety configuration are sensitive launch-segment assets; their classification level drives the controls that constrain FTS reconnaissance against the operator's launch-vehicle interface package.
Downlink content (housekeeping telemetry, payload products, event logs) is the asset whose classification determines whether downlink intercept exposes mission-critical information; the entity must classify this content so encryption and link-protection decisions are properly calibrated.
Source repositories, build artefacts and release manifests are classified information assets; the classification level is the input to the storage, transport and dissemination controls that constrain FSW-development reconnaissance.
Test plans, fuzz-harness configurations and known-blind-spot inventories are highly sensitive assets; their classification governs the recon surface for an adversary mapping the entity's test-tool gaps.