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ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.20-i02

Publication: enisa-stl-2025-03 Space Threat Landscape

Full text

The control text is third-party content; see the official source for the full wording.

Mapped SPARTA techniques

13 techniques

  • Criticality analysis identifying FDIR as a mission-critical resilience function prioritises its protection and is relevant, but criticality analysis is a governance control and does not itself actively defend against the FDIR suppression DE-0001 performs.

  • Criticality analysis identifying the proximity-awareness fusion stack as mission-critical prioritises protection and is relevant, but criticality analysis is a governance control and does not itself actively defend against the sensor deception DE-0009.04 performs.

  • Criticality analysis identifies propulsion as a mission-critical function and prioritises it for protective controls, governing where integrity and access measures apply rather than itself defending against parameter modification.

  • Criticality analysis identifying attitude determination and control as mission-critical is governance relevance that prioritises protection around it, but it does not itself actively prevent or detect parameter manipulation.

  • Criticality analysis identifying the electrical power subsystem as mission-critical directs protection at battery limits and PCDU configurations and is relevant, but criticality analysis is a governance control and does not itself actively prevent the parameter modification EX-0012.09 performs.

  • Criticality analysis identifies C&DH as a mission-critical subsystem and prioritises it for protective controls, governing where integrity and access measures apply rather than itself defending against table modification.

  • IMP-0004DegradationST0009
    addresses
    moderate

    Criticality analysis identifies the mission-critical subsystems whose accelerated degradation would shorten mission lifespan, prioritising protection of the targets IMP-0004 selects.

  • Criticality analysis identifying mission-critical functions, components, and data flows prioritises protection of what REC-0001 most values, but criticality analysis is a governance control and does not itself actively defend against design-information gathering.

  • REC-0001.04Data BusST0001
    addresses
    moderate

    Criticality analysis identifies critical bus controllers and endpoints and prioritises their protection, governing rather than actively defending against the data-bus reconnaissance REC-0001.04 performs.

  • REC-0001.06Maneuver & ControlST0001
    addresses
    moderate

    Criticality analysis identifies GNC and propulsion as mission-critical functions and prioritises their protection, governing rather than actively defending against the intelligence REC-0001.06 collects.

  • REC-0001.07PayloadST0001
    addresses
    moderate

    Criticality analysis identifying payload as a mission-critical function prioritises protection of its command sets and is relevant, but criticality analysis is a governance control and does not itself actively defend against the reconnaissance REC-0001.07 performs.

  • REC-0001.09Fault ManagementST0001
    addresses
    moderate

    Criticality analysis identifies the mission-critical fault-management and safing functions that REC-0001.09 seeks to characterise, prioritising them for protection.

  • REC-0004.01Flight TerminationST0001
    addresses
    moderate

    Criticality analysis identifies flight-termination as a mission-critical function and prioritises protection of its interfaces and keys, governing rather than actively defending against the reconnaissance REC-0004.01 performs.

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.