safemode.space
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EX-0012.09
ST0004Execution
sub-technique

Electrical Power Subsystem

Parent: EX-0012

Description

Adversaries alter parameters and sensed values that govern power generation, storage, and distribution so the spacecraft draws or allocates energy in harmful ways. Editable items include bus voltage/current limits, MPPT setpoints and sweep behavior, array and SADA modes, battery charge/discharge thresholds and temperature derates, state-of-charge estimation constants, latching current limiter (LCL) trip/retry settings, load-shed priorities, heater duty limits, and survival/keep-alive rules. By changing these, a threat actor can drive excess consumption (e.g., disabling load shed, raising heater floors), misreport remaining energy (skewed SoC), or push batteries outside healthy ranges, producing brownouts, repeated safing, or premature capacity loss. Manipulating thresholds and hysteresis can also create oscillations where loads repeatedly drop and re-engage, wasting energy and stressing components. The effect is accelerated depletion or misallocation of finite power, degrading mission operations and potentially preventing recovery after eclipse or anomalies.

Mappings

EU regulation articles

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(f)
    addresses
    high
    derived

    Integrity protection on EPS parameters (bus voltage limits, charge curves, load-shed priorities) safeguards power-subsystem behaviour.

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(h)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Availability obligation covers power-related tampering whose effects directly compromise essential-function availability.

  • eu-space-actArt. 81(3)
    addresses
    high
    direct

    Electrical power subsystem parameters govern survival; 81(3)(b)'s restrict-access-to-critical-functions clause applies to bus voltage limits, MPPT setpoints, battery thresholds.

  • eu-space-actArt. 84(2)
    addresses
    moderate
    inferred

    Art. 84(2)'s comply-with-Annex-VII-5.1 reference is domain-relevant to EPS-config modification but names no specific interdicting mechanism in the cited text.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(b)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Brownouts, repeated safing, premature capacity loss, and load-oscillation patterns are detectable EPS anomalies; Art. 21(2)(b)'s incident-handling capability must surface them from housekeeping telemetry.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(i)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    EPS limits, MPPT setpoints, battery thresholds, LCL trip/retry settings, and load-shed priorities are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs edits to those parameters.

  • nis2-implAnnex 11.3.1
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Authority to alter EPS parameters is privileged; the privileged-account policy applies its identification and review obligations to the population that holds it.

  • nis2-implAnnex 6.4.1
    addresses
    high
    derived

    EPS parameters (bus voltage limits, charge curves, load-shed priorities) are change-managed configuration whose modifications must follow documented procedures with risk-assessment-driven review.

ENISA controls

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.20-i02
    addresses
    high

    Criticality analysis identifying the electrical power subsystem as mission-critical directs protection at battery limits and PCDU configurations and is relevant, but criticality analysis is a governance control and does not itself actively prevent the parameter modification EX-0012.09 performs.

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.24-i07
    addresses
    moderate

    Physics-model verification of EPS commands rejects load-shed and battery-limit edits that violate physical plausibility.

Cross-reference controls

SPARTA countermeasures

Cite as SafeMode Space, EX-0012.09 (SPARTA v3.2).

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.