MITRE D3FEND (Defensive Techniques)
D3-RFS
enhancement

RF Shielding

Parent: D3-PH

Description

Adding physical barriers to a platform to prevent undesired radio interference.

Mapped SPARTA techniques

4 techniques

  • EX-0015Side-Channel AttackST0004
    addresses
    moderate

    EX-0015 is the parent side-channel technique and spans timing, power draw, electromagnetic emissions, acoustic, optical, and thermal channels. RF shielding interdicts exactly one of those. Under the universal-strict standard a control that covers a single non-dominant vector of a broader technique is addresses rather than mitigates, so this is deliberately typed down from the mitigates carried by the EM-specific sub-technique EXF-0002.02.

  • EXF-0002Side-Channel ExfiltrationST0008
    addresses
    moderate

    Side-channel exfiltration at the parent level covers power, EM, timing, thermal, and traffic-pattern channels. Shielding addresses the electromagnetic channel only, leaving the dominant remainder untouched, so the same parent-versus-vector reasoning applied to EX-0015 caps this at addresses.

  • The technique is the capture of unintentional EM emissions from chips, buses, and clocks by near-field probes or proximity receivers. A conductive barrier around the platform attenuates that radiated energy and is the textbook interdiction (the TEMPEST control class). Confidence is moderate rather than high for an excerpt reason a reviewer should weigh: D3FEND frames RF shielding as preventing interference reaching the platform, which is the inbound direction, whereas this technique is outbound emanation. The barrier is physically the same and attenuates both ways, but the cited text does not say so, so a reviewer preferring the excerpt's literal scope should downgrade this to addresses. [Curation] The proposal flagged this itself and the flag is upheld. D3FEND's excerpt describes RF shielding as preventing undesired interference REACHING the platform, which is the inbound direction, while EXF-0002.02 is the capture of emissions LEAVING it. The physical barrier is the same and attenuates both ways, but the corpus standard is what the excerpt supports, not what the mechanism could do, so the claim is recorded at addresses. Shielding remains the right control family; only the strength of the assertion changes.

  • IA-0005.01Compromise EmanationsST0003
    addresses
    moderate

    Compromise of emanations depends on an adversary achieving a close-range vantage point from which unintentional emissions from crypto modules, command decoders, and bus controllers can be sampled. Shielding attenuates the emission at the source and so removes the signal the proximity vantage exists to collect, which is interdiction of the technique's defining vector rather than governance of it. The same excerpt-direction caveat as EXF-0002.02 applies and is why this is moderate. [Curation] Downgraded for the same reason as EXF-0002.02: the excerpt's stated purpose is inbound interference rejection while compromise of emanations is outbound leakage. Recorded at addresses so both members of the pair are treated consistently.

Cite as SafeMode Space, d3fend D3-RFS.

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.