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IA-0005.01
ST0003Initial Access
sub-technique

Compromise Emanations

Parent: IA-0005

Description

With a local vantage point, an adversary analyzes unintentional emissions to infer sensitive information. Crypto modules, command decoders, and main bus controllers can emit patterns correlated with key use, counter updates, or command parsing. Close-range sampling enables coherent averaging, directional sensing, and correlation against known command/telemetry sequences to separate signal from noise. If the emanations are information-bearing (e.g., side-channel leakage of keys, counters, or protocol state), they can be used to reconstruct authentication material, predict anti-replay windows, or derive decoder settings, providing a basis for initial access via crafted traffic.

Mappings

EU regulation articles

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(e)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Confidentiality protection obligations cover processed data; emanations leak data unintentionally and must be constrained at the product level through TEMPEST-style hardening, balanced power and shielding to satisfy the manufacturer's confidentiality obligation.

  • eu-space-actArt. 85(1)
    addresses
    moderate
    inferred

    Art. 85(1)'s cryptographic concept is crypto-domain-relevant to compromise-emanations, but does not interdict the side-channel extraction; physical shielding and masked implementations are the actual mitigation (the Sprint D IA-0005.01 call).

  • eu-space-actArt. 85(2)
    addresses
    low
    inferred

    Art. 85(2)'s key-lifecycle policy is crypto-domain-relevant to compromise-emanations, but limits leaked-key value rather than interdicting the side-channel extraction; physical shielding and power masking are the actual mitigation (the Sprint D IA-0005.01 call).

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(h)
    addresses
    moderate
    inferred

    Art. 21(2)(h) crypto key governance limits the value of leaked key material but does not interdict the side-channel extraction of keys, counters or protocol state from emanations; the operative mitigation is physical shielding and masking. Addresses (domain relevance).

  • nis2-implAnnex 13.2.1
    addresses
    high
    derived

    Compromising emanations are unintentional physical-layer signals; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations require the entity to design and implement protective measures against this class of disclosure where appropriate (shielding, TEMPEST-style controls, emission management).

ENISA controls

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.21-i06
    addresses
    moderate

    Hardware-level power-consumption masking on cryptographic modules raises the cost of side-channel power analysis from proximity emanations.

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.23-i11
    addresses
    moderate

    Key-update-frequency and key-length governance is relevant to limiting the value of keys exposed via emanations, but does not actively defend against the side-channel extraction itself.

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.23-i13
    addresses
    high

    Power masking directly defeats partial-key inference from electromagnetic leakage at close range, the core IA-0005.01 vector.

Cross-reference controls

SPARTA countermeasures

Cite as SafeMode Space, IA-0005.01 (SPARTA v3.2).

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.