Electromagnetic Leakage Attacks
Parent: EXF-0002
Description
Switching activity in chips, buses, and clocks radiates EM energy that can be captured and analyzed to reveal internal computation. Near-field probes (in test) or proximity receivers (on-orbit assets) can observe harmonics and modulation tied to cipher rounds, key schedules, or protocol framing, sometimes with finer granularity than power analysis. Coupling paths include packages, harnesses, SDR front ends, and poorly shielded enclosures. By training on known operations and comparing spectra or time-domain signatures, an adversary can recover keys or reconstruct processed data without touching logical interfaces.
Mappings
EU regulation articles
EM emanations leaking key schedules and protocol framing defeat (2)(e)'s confidentiality property; state-of-the-art mechanisms include shielding, decorrelation, and constant-power design.
EM-leakage countermeasures (TEMPEST-grade shielding, harness routing, package selection) are the manufacturer-side exploitation-mitigation mechanisms (2)(k) requires.
Electromagnetic-leakage attacks (primary mapping: Annex I, Part I, (2)(k)) cascade to (3) — TEMPEST shielding requires regular validation by near-field probe testing in the security review.
EM-leakage countermeasures (TEMPEST shielding, harness routing, decorrelation) are part of the cryptographic concept 85(1) places on the operator.
EM-leakage attacks (primary: Art. 85(1)) cascade to 85(2) — key rotation limits exposure window.
Art. 21(2)(h) crypto policy does not interdict EM-emanation key recovery; the operative mitigation is TEMPEST shielding and emission control, not use-of-cryptography policy. Addresses (domain relevance).
Electromagnetic leakage is exactly the unintentional emission class the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation is established to govern; chassis shielding, harness routing and TEMPEST-style controls reduce EM-channel leakage.
ENISA controls
Hardware power-system design with switching-noise obfuscation reduces EM emissions correlated with cipher-round activity.
Tamper protection is a physical-hardware-protection control relevant to the hardware EXF-0002.02 targets, but the shipping and receiving tamper-proofing and inspection excerpt does not actively counter operational electromagnetic-leakage observation, which needs shielding or masking.
Power masking is the named control against EM-leakage-based partial-key recovery — the EXF-0002.02 vector.
Cross-reference controls
The technique is the capture of unintentional EM emissions from chips, buses, and clocks by near-field probes or proximity receivers. A conductive barrier around the platform attenuates that radiated energy and is the textbook interdiction (the TEMPEST control class). Confidence is moderate rather than high for an excerpt reason a reviewer should weigh: D3FEND frames RF shielding as preventing interference reaching the platform, which is the inbound direction, whereas this technique is outbound emanation. The barrier is physically the same and attenuates both ways, but the cited text does not say so, so a reviewer preferring the excerpt's literal scope should downgrade this to addresses. [Curation] The proposal flagged this itself and the flag is upheld. D3FEND's excerpt describes RF shielding as preventing undesired interference REACHING the platform, which is the inbound direction, while EXF-0002.02 is the capture of emissions LEAVING it. The physical barrier is the same and attenuates both ways, but the corpus standard is what the excerpt supports, not what the mechanism could do, so the claim is recorded at addresses. Shielding remains the right control family; only the strength of the assertion changes.
Referenced in: sparta-data
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
- nist-80053-rev5SI-19(4)Removal, Masking, Encryption, Hashing, or Replacement of Direct Identifiersrelates tomoderate
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
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Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
T2029.002 'Electromagnetic reconnaissance' explicitly covers EM-emission measurement to attempt side-channel attacks at proximity — addresses the proximity-vantage-point subset of EXF-0002.02.
T2035 covers all side-channel exfiltration mechanisms — addresses EXF-0002.02 EM Leakage Attacks (capturing radiated EM energy from switching activity).
SPARTA countermeasures
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Mapped by SPARTA, not curated by SafeMode Space.
Cite as SafeMode Space, EXF-0002.02 (SPARTA v3.2).