Art. 76(2)

Art. 76(2)(a)'s ensure-resilience obligation is domain-relevant to ephemeris manipulation, but the generic mandate names no interdicting mechanism; PNT cross-checks and integrity monitoring would interdict.

Art. 76(2)(a)'s ensure-resilience obligation is domain-relevant to onboard SSA/SDA-sensor deception, but the generic resilience mandate names no mechanism interdicting the deception vector; sensor-fusion validation and input authentication would be the interdicting controls.

Art. 76(2)(a)'s ensure-resilience obligation is domain-relevant to code exploitation, but the generic mandate names no interdicting mechanism; vulnerability handling and testing would interdict.

Art. 76(2)(b)'s effective-technical-control obligation is domain-relevant to propulsion-parameter modification, but it names no interdicting mechanism such as authenticated commanding; it governs the control outcome, not the vector.

Art. 76(2)(a)'s ensure-resilience obligation is domain-relevant to PNT spoofing, but the generic mandate names no interdicting mechanism; PNT cross-checks and integrity monitoring would interdict.

PNT jamming degrades navigation; 76(2)(a) ensure-resilience extends to alternate-PNT designs (oscillator hold-over, INS) that maintain function during GNSS denial.

76(2)(a)'s ensure-resilience-of-space-infrastructure obligation includes the cyber-physical attack surface of close-proximity threats — operator risk-management measures must contemplate proximity-derived attack capability.

Art. 76(2)(a)'s ensure-resilience obligation is domain-relevant to safe-mode abuse, but the generic resilience mandate names no mechanism interdicting unauthorised safe-mode access; command authentication on the safe-mode path would be the interdiction.