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EX-0016.03
ST0004Execution
sub-technique

Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Jamming

Parent: EX-0016

Description

The attacker raises the noise floor in GNSS bands so satellite navigation signals are not acquired or tracked. Loss of PNT manifests as degraded or unavailable position/velocity/time solutions, which in turn disrupts functions that depend on them, time distribution, attitude aiding, scheduling, anti-replay windows, and visibility prediction. Because GNSS signals at the receiver are extremely weak, modest jammers within the antenna field of view can produce outsized effects; mobile emitters can create intermittent outages aligned with the attacker’s objectives.

Mappings

EU regulation articles

  • eu-space-actArt. 76(2)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    PNT jamming degrades navigation; 76(2)(a) ensure-resilience extends to alternate-PNT designs (oscillator hold-over, INS) that maintain function during GNSS denial.

  • eu-space-actArt. 87(3)
    addresses
    moderate
    inferred

    Art. 87(3)(f)'s ground-segment-interference crisis-planning scenario is domain-adjacent to PNT jamming, but does not interdict GNSS denial or cleanly cover space-segment PNT; alternate-PNT design is the resilience mitigation.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(b)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    GNSS unavailability or PNT-solution degradation aligned with attacker geometry is a detectable incident; Art. 21(2)(b)'s incident-handling capability must surface those signals from receiver telemetry.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(c)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    PNT-outage continuity — multi-source navigation, time-distribution fallbacks, alternate scheduling — is core business-continuity practice under Art. 21(2)(c) for missions where GNSS-derived time underpins essential services.

  • nis2-implAnnex 13.2.1
    addresses
    high
    derived

    PNT jamming raises the GNSS noise floor; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats covers receiver hardening (multi-constellation, multi-frequency, controlled-radiation-pattern antennas) and operational fall-back to non-GNSS time/position sources.

ENISA controls

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.23-i03
    mitigates
    moderate

    Transmission security on PNT signal reception (jam-resistant signal acquisition) reduces susceptibility to GNSS-band jamming.

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.23-i06
    mitigates
    high

    Resilient PNT with fault-tolerant alternative time sourcing reduces the operational impact when GNSS bands are jammed.

Cross-reference controls

SPARTA countermeasures

Cite as SafeMode Space, EX-0016.03 (SPARTA v3.2).

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.