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EX-0014.04
ST0004Execution
sub-technique

Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Spoofing

Parent: EX-0014

Description

The adversary transmits GNSS-like signals (or manipulates crosslink-distributed time/ephemeris) so the spacecraft’s navigation solution reflects attacker-chosen states. With believable code phases, Doppler, and navigation messages, the victim can be pulled to a false position/velocity/time, causing downstream functions, attitude pointing limits, station visibility prediction, eclipse timing, antenna pointing, and anti-replay windows, to misbehave. Even when GNSS is not the primary navigation source, spoofed PNT can bias timekeeping or seed filters that fuse multiple sensors, leading to mis-scheduling and errant control. The defining feature is externally provided navigation/time that passes validity checks yet encodes a crafted trajectory or epoch.

Mappings

EU regulation articles

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(f)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Integrity protection extends to PNT-receiver design choices: multi-constellation cross-checks and integrity-monitoring fall-back are product-side defenses against PNT spoofing.

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(h)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Availability obligation covers continued operation under PNT spoofing through fall-back to non-GNSS time/position sources.

  • eu-space-actArt. 76(2)
    addresses
    moderate
    inferred

    Art. 76(2)(a)'s ensure-resilience obligation is domain-relevant to PNT spoofing, but the generic mandate names no interdicting mechanism; PNT cross-checks and integrity monitoring would interdict.

  • eu-space-actArt. 84(2)
    addresses
    moderate
    inferred

    Art. 84(2)'s comply-with-Annex-VII-5.1 reference is domain-relevant to PNT spoofing, but names no specific interdicting mechanism; authenticated time and ephemeris validation would interdict.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(b)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    PNT-solution discontinuities and inconsistencies between GNSS-derived and propagated-ephemeris position are detectable via fusion-anomaly monitoring; Art. 21(2)(b)'s incident-handling capability must surface them despite individual signals passing validity checks.

  • nis2-implAnnex 13.2.1
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    GNSS-spoofing manipulates the RF environment; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover the design measures (anti-spoofing receivers, multi-constellation cross-checks, drop-out tolerance) that reduce PNT-spoof effects.

  • nis2-implAnnex 3.2.1
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Monitoring-and-logging procedures must surface PNT-solution anomalies (impossible jumps, cross-source disagreements) that signal spoofing.

ENISA controls

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.23-i06
    addresses
    high

    Resilient PNT with GNSS authentication mechanisms verifying authenticity of the GNSS signal and transmitting entity is the canonical defense against PNT spoofing.

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.24-i07
    mitigates
    moderate

    Real-time physics-model verification of navigation inputs flags PNT solutions that violate orbital plausibility.

Cross-reference controls

SPARTA countermeasures

Cite as SafeMode Space, EX-0014.04 (SPARTA v3.2).

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.