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EX-0018.03
ST0004Execution
sub-technique

High-Powered Microwave

Parent: EX-0018

Description

High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can be used to disrupt or destroy a satellite’s electronics. A “front-door” HPM attack uses a satellite’s own antennas as an entry path, while a “back-door” attack attempts to enter through small seams or gaps around electrical connections and shielding. A front-door attack is more straightforward to carry out, provided the HPM is positioned within the field of view of the antenna that it is using as a pathway, but it can be thwarted if the satellite uses circuits designed to detect and block surges of energy entering through the antenna. In contrast, a back-door attack is more challenging, because it must exploit design or manufacturing flaws, but it can be conducted from many angles relative to the satellite. Both types of attacks can be either reversible or irreversible; however, the attacker may not be able to control the severity of the damage from the attack. Both front-door and back-door HPM attacks can be difficult to attribute to an attacker, and like a laser weapon, the attacker may not know if the attack has been successful. A HPM attack may leave the target satellite disabled and uncontrollable which can cause it to drift into other satellites, creating further collateral damage.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101

Mappings

EU regulation articles

  • eu-space-actArt. 82(1)
    addresses
    high
    direct

    HPM attacks via front-door (antenna entry) and back-door (seam exploitation) require physical resilience design — within 82(1)'s scope including surge-protection circuits and shielding measures.

  • eu-space-actArt. 86(3)
    addresses
    low
    direct

    HPM affects single satellites; constellation redundancy under 86(3) limits mission-level impact.

  • nis2-implAnnex 13.2.1
    addresses
    high
    derived

    HPM weapons couple through antennas and harnesses; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers RF-front-end limiters, harness shielding and chassis hardening that reduce HPM consequences.

ENISA controls

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.35-i08
    mitigates
    moderate

    Failsafe systems and resilience mechanisms reduce the impact of HPM-induced electronic disruption.

Cross-reference controls

SPARTA countermeasures

Cite as SafeMode Space, EX-0018.03 (SPARTA v3.2).

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.