Annex 13.2.1

Downlink jamming is an RF-environmental threat; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover link-budget margin, antenna-pattern shaping and operational frequency-plan diversity that resist jamming-induced downlink loss.

GPS-ephemeris spoofing of the on-board receiver is an RF-environmental threat; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover anti-spoofing receiver design, multi-source cross-checks and integrity-monitoring fall-back.

Optical dazzling, reflective camouflage and corner-cube spoofing target the spacecraft's onboard sensors physically; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers aperture-cover design, filter selection and other mitigations against directed-optical effects.

RF-layer flooding (in-band noise injection at the receiver) is a physical-layer threat the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers through link-budget design, antenna pattern shaping and signal hardening.

GNSS-spoofing manipulates the RF environment; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover the design measures (anti-spoofing receivers, multi-constellation cross-checks, drop-out tolerance) that reduce PNT-spoof effects.

Side-channel attacks observe physical byproducts (power, EM, timing); the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers the design measures (shielding, balanced power, emission-control) that reduce side-channel leakage.

Jamming is an RF-environmental threat; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers link-budget design, antenna-pattern shaping and operational frequency-plan diversity.

Uplink jamming targets the spacecraft receive antenna with elevated noise; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats covers spacecraft-side hardening (sidelobe management, link-budget margin, anti-jam waveforms).

Downlink jamming targets users on the ground; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers user-segment-side hardening (high-gain receivers, frequency hopping, beam-isolation).

PNT jamming raises the GNSS noise floor; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats covers receiver hardening (multi-constellation, multi-frequency, controlled-radiation-pattern antennas) and operational fall-back to non-GNSS time/position sources.

Non-kinetic physical attacks (EMP, lasers, HPM) deliver physical effects through the environment; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation requires the entity to design and implement protective measures against these threat classes where appropriate.

EMP transients couple into spacecraft electronics; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover the design measures (radiation hardening, harness shielding, transient-suppression) that reduce EMP consequences.

High-powered laser attacks damage optical centers and solar arrays; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover aperture-cover design, deployable filters and damage-tolerant array architectures.

HPM weapons couple through antennas and harnesses; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers RF-front-end limiters, harness shielding and chassis hardening that reduce HPM consequences.

Side-channel exfiltration observes physical byproducts of computation; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover the design measures (shielding, balanced power, emission management) that reduce side-channel leakage.

Power-analysis attacks exploit instantaneous power consumption; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers power-rail conditioning, balanced-logic design and other physical-layer controls that resist SPA/DPA.

Electromagnetic leakage is exactly the unintentional emission class the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation is established to govern; chassis shielding, harness routing and TEMPEST-style controls reduce EM-channel leakage.

Where timing variations leak via observable response latencies on RF links, the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation contributes through emission-management and dummy-traffic measures.

Thermal-imaging exfiltration observes IR signatures of processors and harnesses; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligation covers thermal-signature management (insulation, radiator placement, deliberate dummy heaters) that resists thermal analysis.

Proximity-operations exfiltration captures unintentional emissions (near-field RF, conducted/structure-borne, optical/IR signatures) of the entity's spacecraft; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover emission-management and shielding measures that resist this collection class.

Protection against physical and environmental threats covers the spacecraft as a physical asset; rendezvous and proximity threats are physical threats whose consequences the entity must reduce where appropriate (shielding, attitude management, optical aperture covers).

Compromising emanations are unintentional physical-layer signals; the protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations require the entity to design and implement protective measures against this class of disclosure where appropriate (shielding, TEMPEST-style controls, emission management).

Proximity grappling acts physically on the spacecraft (cover removal, mechanical access exposure); protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover the design measures (covers, shrouds, latches) that reduce the consequences of physical proximity.