Art. 21(2)(c)

Telemetry continuity — alternate downlink stations, deferred playback recovery, and crisis-management procedures during loss-of-monitoring — falls under business continuity, backup management, and crisis management at Art. 21(2)(c).

Service continuity during downlink loss — alternate ground apertures, dwell-extension, deferred-recovery procedures — falls under business continuity, backup management, and crisis management at Art. 21(2)(c).

Contingency-mode design — what command sets are accepted, what rate/size limits change, what alternate receivers activate — falls under business-continuity and crisis-management practice under Art. 21(2)(c); the obligation requires those procedures not to relax security to gain availability.

Backup management, disaster recovery, and crisis management under Art. 21(2)(c) is the precise obligation that bounds ransomware impact — restoring engineering telemetry, payload data, command tables, and ephemerides without paying.

Backup management, disaster recovery, and crisis management under Art. 21(2)(c) are the obligations that ensure mission continuity in the face of irreversible data/image destruction — including custody of golden images and undo logs the wiper attempts to erase.

Contingency dictionary scope, alternate-receiver activation rules, and emergency-scheduling cadences are squarely within business-continuity, backup-management, and crisis-management practice under Art. 21(2)(c); the obligation requires those procedures not to relax security to gain availability.

Service availability under volumetric attack — backup paths, throttling regimes, and recovery procedures — falls under business continuity, backup management, and crisis management under Art. 21(2)(c).

Service continuity under temporary RF interference — failover paths, alternate ground apertures, dwell-extension procedures — falls under business continuity, backup management, and crisis management under Art. 21(2)(c).

Uplink outage continuity — dwell-extension, alternate apertures, deferred operations — is core business-continuity practice under Art. 21(2)(c) for missions where commandability availability targets must be maintained despite jamming.

Downlink continuity for affected user terminals (alternate stations, beam reconfigurations, retasked relays) is core business-continuity practice under Art. 21(2)(c).

PNT-outage continuity — multi-source navigation, time-distribution fallbacks, alternate scheduling — is core business-continuity practice under Art. 21(2)(c) for missions where GNSS-derived time underpins essential services.

Catastrophic-component-loss continuity (failover to redundant electronics, alternate-orbit operations, mission-end-of-life rehearsals) is core business-continuity, disaster-recovery, and crisis-management practice under Art. 21(2)(c).

Backup management and crisis-management procedures under Art. 21(2)(c) are how the entity designs and exercises secondary/contingency communication channels — the obligation that should preserve security parity, not relax it for availability.

Backup ground operations and the processes that shift traffic to the standby site (planned exercises, weather diversions, anomaly failover) are the precise scope of business continuity, backup management, and disaster recovery under Art. 21(2)(c).

Backup receiver design — when it activates, what command set it accepts — falls under business-continuity and disaster-recovery design; Art. 21(2)(c) is the obligation that requires the entity to prove its contingency configurations don't relax security to gain availability.

Counterspace effects that force the target into contingency states with broader command acceptance are countered by business-continuity, backup-management, and crisis-management planning under Art. 21(2)(c) that ensures contingency states do not relax security.

Contingency-mode design, dictionary scope, and rapid-response procedures are squarely within business-continuity and crisis-management practice under Art. 21(2)(c); the obligation requires those procedures not to weaken security.

Business-continuity planning, backup communications paths, and crisis-management procedures under Art. 21(2)(c) limit mission impact when adversaries disrupt or modify communications during critical times.

Business continuity, backup management, disaster recovery, and crisis management under Art. 21(2)(c) are precisely the controls that bound the mission impact of a denial event.

Disaster-recovery planning and crisis-management procedures under Art. 21(2)(c) define how the entity continues to deliver mission services as accelerated subsystem degradation shortens the spacecraft's useful lifespan.

Backup management, disaster recovery, and crisis management under Art. 21(2)(c) are the obligations that ensure mission continuity (including data recoverability) in the face of destruction-class incidents.