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DE-0002.02
ST0006Defense Evasion
sub-technique

Jam Link Signal

Parent: DE-0002

Description

Threat actors may overwhelm/jam the downlink signal to prevent transmitted telemetry signals from reaching their destination without severe modification/interference, effectively leaving ground controllers unaware of vehicle activity during this time. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the spacecraft while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place.

Mappings

EU regulation articles

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(h)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    RF jamming itself is environmental and outside CRA's manufacturer scope, but (2)(h) places a positive obligation on the product to maintain availability of essential functions through resilience and DoS mitigation — link-margin design, alternate paths, autonomous-mode fallback partially mitigate jam-induced telemetry loss.

  • eu-space-actArt. 86(3)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    86(3)(b)'s geographical-splitting-into-distinct-locations limits jamming impact when alternate ground sites can take over reception.

  • eu-space-actArt. 87(3)
    addresses
    high
    direct

    Downlink jamming is a specific case of 87(3)(f) interferences-on-the-ground-segment — the response-and-recovery plans must contemplate jamming scenarios.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(b)
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Sustained downlink jamming aligned with monitoring windows is detectable from receive-station telemetry; Art. 21(2)(b)'s incident-handling capability must surface and triage those events.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(c)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    Service continuity during downlink loss — alternate ground apertures, dwell-extension, deferred-recovery procedures — falls under business continuity, backup management, and crisis management at Art. 21(2)(c).

  • nis2-implAnnex 13.2.1
    addresses
    high
    derived

    Downlink jamming is an RF-environmental threat; protection-against-physical-and-environmental-threats obligations cover link-budget margin, antenna-pattern shaping and operational frequency-plan diversity that resist jamming-induced downlink loss.

  • nis2-implAnnex 3.2.1
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Monitoring-and-logging procedures must surface link-margin degradation and noise-floor excursions on the downlink, which are the observable signatures of jamming used as evasion.

ENISA controls

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.23-i03
    mitigates
    high

    Transmission security with jam-resistant waveforms is the canonical defense against downlink-jamming-induced telemetry loss.

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.31-i06
    addresses
    moderate

    Geographically distributed redundant ground stations preserve a path for telemetry reception when one site is jammed.

  • ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.35-i04
    mitigates
    high

    Antenna nulling and adaptive filtering actively interdict DE-0002.02's defining vector, RF jamming of the downlink signal, by detecting the jamming source/frequency and suppressing it (nulling the jamming region, filtering the jammed band) so legitimate telemetry transmissions proceed and reach ground controllers. The control directly preserves link availability against the RF interference that the technique uses to deny telemetry, interdicting both the defining vector (RF link jamming) and the dominant scope (denial of the downlink signal); efficacy degrades only against wideband jammers, a coverage caveat that does not change the mitigates relationship for the dominant jamming case.

Cross-reference controls

SPARTA countermeasures

Cite as SafeMode Space, DE-0002.02 (SPARTA v3.2).

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.