Art. 87(3)

Downlink jamming is a specific case of 87(3)(f) interferences-on-the-ground-segment — the response-and-recovery plans must contemplate jamming scenarios.

Art. 87(3)(f)'s ground-segment-interference scenario is domain-relevant to AGC-tampering self-denial, but lists a crisis scenario rather than interdicting the tampering.

87(3)(f) explicitly covers interferences on the ground segment as a crisis-management scenario the operator's response-and-recovery plans must address — jamming is the canonical case.

Uplink jamming is a specific case of 87(3)(f) interferences requiring response-and-recovery planning — including alternate uplink procedures and contingency commanding paths.

Downlink jamming affects ground-receive capability — within 87(3)(f) interferences-on-the-ground-segment scope; alternate geographically distributed sites mitigate via geographical splitting under 86(3)(b).

Art. 87(3)(f)'s ground-segment-interference crisis-planning scenario is domain-adjacent to PNT jamming, but does not interdict GNSS denial or cleanly cover space-segment PNT; alternate-PNT design is the resilience mitigation.

Art. 87(3)(f)'s ground-segment-interference scenario is domain-relevant to counterspace effects, but lists a crisis scenario rather than providing a concrete interdiction or resilience mechanism.

87(3)(f) explicitly covers interferences on the ground segment as a crisis-management scenario — denial is the primary case.