All techniques
DE-0003.04
ST0006Defense Evasion
sub-technique

Command Receivers Received Signal Strength

Parent: DE-0003

Description

Threat actors may target the on-board command receivers received signal parameters (i.e., automatic gain control (AGC)) in order to stop specific commands or signals from being processed by the spacecraft. For ground controllers to communicate with spacecraft in orbit, the on-board receivers need to be configured to receive signals with a specific signal to noise ratio (ratio of signal power to the noise power). Targeting values related to the antenna signaling that are modifiable can prevent the spacecraft from receiving ground commands.

Mappings

EU regulation articles

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(f)
    addresses
    high
    direct

    Modifying AGC and signal-strength parameters is unauthorized modification of receiver configuration — within (2)(f)'s integrity-of-configuration scope.

  • craAnnex I, Part I, (2)(h)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    AGC tampering blocks legitimate command reception, attacking the availability of the command-and-control function — the resilience obligation in (2)(h).

  • eu-space-actArt. 84(2)
    addresses
    high
    direct

    AGC and signal-strength parameter manipulation alters receiver configuration covered by 84(2)'s Annex VII point 5.1.

  • eu-space-actArt. 87(3)
    addresses
    moderate
    inferred

    Art. 87(3)(f)'s ground-segment-interference scenario is domain-relevant to AGC-tampering self-denial, but lists a crisis scenario rather than interdicting the tampering.

  • nis2Art. 21(2)(i)
    addresses
    moderate
    direct

    AGC parameters and signal-to-noise thresholds are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can modify them.

  • nis2-implAnnex 3.2.1
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Monitoring-and-logging procedures should capture AGC and lock-state telemetry trends to surface anomalous receiver behaviour configured to silently reject legitimate signals.

  • nis2-implAnnex 6.4.1
    addresses
    moderate
    derived

    Modifications to receiver AGC and signal-strength thresholds are change-managed configuration; documented procedures govern their alteration to prevent receivers from being detuned to refuse legitimate command traffic.

ENISA controls

  • Configuration management of AGC parameters surfaces unauthorised modifications used to suppress specific signals.

  • Critical-telemetry-points monitoring covers receiver AGC/RSSI as a defined telemetry point flagging anomalies.

Cross-reference controls

SPARTA countermeasures

Cite as SafeMode Space, DE-0003.04 (SPARTA v3.2).

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.