Art. 21(2)(i)

FDIR rule tables, watchdog/heartbeat thresholds, sanity checks, command interlocks, inhibit masks, and voting/redundancy logic are first-class access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i) governs which roles can edit them.

Ground processing pipelines, telemetry display interfaces, and alert-routing services are the precise asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Telemetry publishers, packet filters, rate controls, event/report channels, and recorder-playback configuration are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) governs which roles can disable, mute, or reroute on-board telemetry generation.

Mode controls, counter registers, and reporting-configuration parameters are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) governs which paths can manipulate the values operators rely on.

Per-receiver/per-antenna/per-band enable states are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i) governs which roles can toggle command-receiver state.

AGC parameters and signal-to-noise thresholds are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can modify them.

Telemetry-mode controls, recorder-playback configuration, and per-VCID/APID selection parameters are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i) governs which roles can switch modes or thin observability.

Crypto-mode selectors and algorithm-profile registers are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which sessions and roles can alter them.

Watchdog parameters (timeout durations, windowed bounds, prescalers, reset-action ladders, petting-source registers) are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which paths can edit them.

DE-0005 exploits safe-mode relaxed authentication, timetag screening and interlocks to get maintenance-looking commands accepted; NIS2 21(2)(i) access control policies govern keeping authentication from being improperly relaxed across operating modes.

Allowlists/whitelists are first-class access-controlled configuration that decides what executes; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles and paths can edit them.

Log buffer parameters (severity filters, per-subsystem quotas, dump-window scheduling) and recorder/event catalogs are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs edits that change retention behaviour.

DE-0011 leverages valid credentials to act undetected where credential use is poorly segmented or monitored; NIS2 21(2)(i) access control policies and asset management govern this risk.

EX-0003 subverts command authentication and authorization (short-circuited MAC checks, widened anti-replay windows, altered policy tables); NIS2 21(2)(i) access control policies govern the integrity of the authority-validation this technique attacks.

Maintenance/contingency-mode hardware command sets, register-write opcodes, fuse-programming sequences, and built-in-test commands are access-controlled functions; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles/sessions can issue them.

Maintenance shells, management consoles, and privileged syscall paths are access-controlled functions; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can reach them and under what conditions.

EX-0011 exploits relaxed authentication and interlocks during safe-mode to get unauthorised commands accepted; NIS2 21(2)(i) access control policies govern keeping command authentication from being improperly relaxed across operating modes.

Direct memory read/write commands, table-load services, file transfers, and maintenance procedures are access-controlled functions; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can invoke them and how their use is audited.

Internal-register write commands are access-controlled functions; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which sessions and roles can issue them.

Pub/sub maps, opcode-handler bindings, and bus routing tables are access-controlled configuration assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs the edits that reshape control and visibility.

Direct-memory write/load services, block loaders, and file-loaders that copy content into working memory are precisely the access-controlled functions Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Subscriber/application tables and 1553 RT/subaddress configurations are access-controlled configuration assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs the edits that reshape who hears what and when.

Scheduler parameters (priorities, periods, deadlines, CPU budgets, watchdog thresholds, tick rates) are access-controlled real-time configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can edit them.

Mass-memory file catalogs, recorder indices, and Level-0 stream stores are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs who can rewrite frame headers, reorder packets, or substitute segments.

Propulsion calibration values, valve timing limits, inhibit masks, delta-V tables, and momentum-management coupling are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can modify them.

Star-tracker masks, sensor alignments, gyro biases, estimator covariances, controller gains, and actuator saturation limits are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs edits to those parameters.

EPS limits, MPPT setpoints, battery thresholds, LCL trip/retry settings, and load-shed priorities are access-controlled engineering configuration; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs edits to those parameters.

Opcode-to-handler maps, argument schemas, queue depths, message-ID routing, pub/sub bindings, and timeline entries are precisely the access-controlled C&DH configuration Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Watchdog control registers, prescaler settings, and reset-ladder configuration are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which paths can disable, mask, or alter the WDT supervision regime.

Clock registers, time-distribution services, and disciplining-source configuration are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can write them.

Training corpora and test vectors are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs who can submit, label, or modify the data on which on-board models are trained.

Per-session rate limits, per-account quotas, and queue-priority configuration are the access-control discipline Art. 21(2)(i) governs — bounding the resource impact a single legitimate-but-misused identity can produce.

Time-distribution services, disciplining-source selection, and clock-register access are access-controlled functions; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs who can write them.

Radio/optical configuration commands, virtual-channel/APID remappings, beacon content edits, and regenerative-payload routing tables are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can issue them and how their use is audited.

Transponder routing/translation tables and gain/polarization controls are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can remap input-output paths or enable auxiliary ports that bypass mission distribution.

Operator workstations, telemetry processing pipelines, and archive databases are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs who reaches them and the boundary between mission-data and exfiltration paths.

Hosted-payload command sets, file services, telemetry paths, and gateway processors that bridge to the host bus are the precise asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Operator workstations, MCC software, schedulers, modems, antenna control, key-loading tools, HSMs, SLE/CSP gateways, and identity providers are precisely the asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Command queues, procedure libraries, dictionaries, and rapid-response/maintenance workflows are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) is the obligation that constrains who can edit them and how their use is audited.

User-plane and control/management-plane separation is access-control discipline; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs the gateways through which user-segment traffic must not reach mission cores.

IA-0010 gains first execution during safe-mode by exploiting relaxed authentication, anti-replay and command-set restrictions; NIS2 21(2)(i) access control policies govern keeping authentication consistent across operating modes.

Peripherals, removable media, and lab-formatting tools are assets whose connection to flight hardware must be governed by access-control + asset-management discipline under Art. 21(2)(i).

Test controllers, EGSE, simulators, flatsats, loaders, and golden artefacts are precisely the asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs — including the lab-network bridges between otherwise separate enclaves.

Bus/payload data routes, shared processors, and communication links are the asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs — preventing the bus's compromise from cascading into the hosted payload through shared internal interfaces.

Mission-critical data is an asset whose access must be governed by access-control policies and asset-management discipline under Art. 21(2)(i); least-privilege role design constrains who can stage exfiltration.

Gateway processors, file services, table-load endpoints, time/ephemeris distribution paths, and shared backplanes between payload and bus are precisely the asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Bus-segregation, role enforcement on remote terminals/bus controllers, and gateway-bridge access controls are the precise asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs — preventing any peripheral that can transmit from gaining system-wide influence.

Crosslink gateway functions that bridge into command/data paths are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which crosslink message classes can reach which onboard subscribers.

Inter-partition communication ports, shared-memory windows, hypercalls, and DMA-engine permissions are access-controlled isolation boundaries; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which partitions can invoke which inter-partition mechanisms.

Umbilicals, EGSE workstations, separation avionics, and inhibit/telemetry-gateway lines are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs which roles can issue commissioning-link traffic across the LV/payload boundary.

LM-0007 crosses enclave and vehicle boundaries by reusing operator, service and station credentials where roles and scopes are broad or reused; NIS2 21(2)(i) access control policies and asset management govern this risk.

Operator workstations, schedulers/orchestrators, station-control systems, automation scripts, procedure libraries, identity/ticketing systems, and cloud-hosted mission services are precisely the asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Keys, key-encryption keys, key identifiers, algorithm profiles, and rekey command sequences are first-class access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) governs which roles can author, transport, or invoke key-loading procedures.

PER-0005 sustains access using valid credentials where credential lifecycle management, segmentation and asset management are weak; NIS2 21(2)(i) access control policies and asset management is the measure that governs this risk.

Mission control servers, automation/scheduling systems, SLE/CSP gateways, identity providers, and cloud data paths are the precise asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs across enclaves.

Operator workstations, mission control servers, procedure libraries, scheduler/orchestration services, key-loading tools/HSMs, and timing distribution are the precise asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Keys, KEKs, key-loading tools, HSMs, and recovery procedures are first-class access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) is the obligation that constrains who can read, transport, or operate them.

ICDs, block diagrams, SBOMs, AIT travelers, and as-built/as-flown deltas are sensitive engineering assets; access-control policies and asset-management discipline under Art. 21(2)(i) govern who can reach them and how leakage from contractor laptops, RFP appendices, or vendor manuals is constrained.

Source code, stripped images with recognizable patterns, configuration tables, and test harnesses are mission-critical assets whose disclosure access-control policies and asset-management practices under Art. 21(2)(i) must restrict.

Keys, counters, and MAC parameters are first-class access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) constrains who can read, transport, or load them through the integration and operations chain.

Bus ICDs, harness drawings, AIT photos, and schedule tables are sensitive engineering assets; access-control + asset-management discipline under Art. 21(2)(i) governs who can extract them from labs, vendor sites, or document repositories.

Payload ICDs, command sets, gateway locations, and engineering-telemetry mnemonics are the precise asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management requirement is meant to govern, particularly where payload traffic bridges to C&DH networks.

FDIR docs, autonomy rule tables, FMEAs, and anomaly response playbooks describe how the spacecraft fails safe; they are sensitive operational assets whose disclosure Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation is meant to constrain.

Access-control policies under Art. 21(2)(i) are how the entity decides who holds admin/approval/funding-routing roles in the first place; least-privilege design limits the value of any single account a recon-driven phish could bridge.

Command dictionaries/databases, enable-code stores, and procedure libraries are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) governs who within and outside the entity can read them.

Mission control accounts, modem credentials, station-control credentials, VPN tokens, SLE/CSP service credentials, and CI/CD secrets are precisely the asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs across issuance, storage, rotation, and revocation.

Repositories, CI/CD orchestrators, code-signing services/HSMs, defect trackers, and SIL/HIL rigs are the precise asset class Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management obligation governs.

Repositories, protected branches/tags, CI orchestrators, package registries, and signing tokens are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i)'s access-control + asset-management discipline governs which roles can read or alter them.

Procurement artefacts, SBOMs/BOMs, key certificates, and service contracts are access-controlled assets; Art. 21(2)(i) is the obligation that constrains who can compile or extract the choke-point map an adversary would otherwise harvest.