All ENISA publications
ENISA-STL-2025-03-sD.21-i01

Publication: enisa-stl-2025-03 Space Threat Landscape

Full text

The control text is third-party content; see the official source for the full wording.

Mapped SPARTA techniques

33 techniques

  • Configuration management with documented baselines covers the parameter and limit tables, command interlocks, and inhibit masks DE-0001 modifies.

  • Configuration management of telemetry mode, packet filters, and reporting rates surfaces unauthorised modifications that suppress on-board telemetry generation.

  • Configuration management of mode indicators, downlink modes, and crypto-mode selectors detects unauthorised obfuscation of on-board values.

  • Configuration management of command-receiver enable/disable states is the discipline that surfaces deliberate quiet-window manipulation.

  • Configuration management of AGC parameters surfaces unauthorised modifications used to suppress specific signals.

  • Configuration management of receiver lock-mode settings detects unauthorised modifications that bias acquisition states.

  • Telemetry downlink modes (real-time channels, recorder playback, beacon/summary, event-driven) are configuration items whose baseline must be monitored under configuration management.

  • DE-0003.07Cryptographic ModesST0006
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of crypto-profile selectors and key-ID rotation surfaces unauthorised mode flips.

  • DE-0003.09System Clock for EvasionST0006
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of clock disciplining sources and time-service settings detects unauthorised slewing for evasion.

  • Configuration management of watchdog-timer parameters establishes the baseline whose modification DE-0003.11 attempts to mask process activity.

  • DE-0006Modify WhitelistST0006
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of whitelist baselines surfaces additions of unauthorised entries.

  • DE-0008Evasion via BootkitST0006
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of boot configuration words, image-selection logic, and device trees detects bootkit-installed hooks that persist across resets.

  • Configuration management with monitoring of security configurations identifies modifications to policy tables, key identifiers, and counter initialization.

  • EX-0004Compromise Boot MemoryST0004
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of boot-configuration words, OTP fuses, and image-selection logic identifies unauthorized changes that EX-0004 introduces.

  • Configuration management with least-functionality baseline removes maintenance and contingency-mode hardware commands not required in nominal operations.

  • EX-0006Disable/Bypass EncryptionST0004
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management with monitoring of security configurations detects modifications that toggle test modes or downgrade negotiated suites.

  • EX-0009.02Operating SystemST0004
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management with the principle of least functionality removes maintenance shells and management consoles from the flight build.

  • EX-0010.04BootkitST0004
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of boot configuration words, fuses, and image-selection logic detects modifications a bootkit makes to redirect early-boot trust.

  • Configuration management with documented, monitored, and reviewed configurations is the discipline that detects unauthorised modifications to control data EX-0012 makes.

  • EX-0012.01RegistersST0004
    addresses
    high

    Configuration-management baselines for security configurations cover device and control registers — the values EX-0012.01 modifies.

  • Routing/subscriber tables are configuration items whose baseline must be established, documented, monitored, and reviewed under configuration management.

  • Application/subscriber tables are configuration items under configuration management; modifications outside the baseline are flagged.

  • Schedules and timeline configurations fall under documented configuration baselines whose unauthorised modification triggers review.

  • Configuration management of the C&DH baseline detects unauthorised modifications EX-0012.10 makes.

  • Watchdog-timer values are configuration items whose baseline must be documented and monitored under configuration management.

  • EX-0012.12System ClockST0004
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of system-clock baselines detects unauthorised slewing or epoch changes.

  • EX-0014.01Time SpoofST0004
    addresses
    moderate

    Configuration management of distributed time-service settings detects unauthorised slewing toward attacker-chosen values.

  • Configuration management of secondary-link enable states, beacon configurations, and contingency profiles surfaces unauthorised activation of out-of-band paths.

  • Configuration management of radio/optical link configuration — carriers, modulation/coding profiles, virtual channels, beacon content, regenerative routing tables — directly defeats EXF-0006 unauthorised modifications.

  • Configuration management of SDR profiles (DSP chains, filters, mixers, FEC, framing) surfaces unauthorised modifications introducing covert subcarriers or modified preambles.

  • EXF-0006.02TransponderST0008
    addresses
    high

    Configuration management of transponder input-output paths, translation frequencies, polarization, gain, and routing tables surfaces unauthorised re-routing for covert downlinks.

  • PER-0001Memory CompromiseST0005
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of init scripts, table loaders, and event hooks detects modifications used to reinstate unauthorized logic on boot.

  • PER-0004Replace Cryptographic KeysST0005
    mitigates
    moderate

    Configuration management of key identifiers, selectors, and algorithm profiles detects unauthorised changes to crypto material configuration.

Built 2026-07-25 from 216 techniques, 334 regulation articles, 125 ENISA controls, 2,610 framework controls, and 90 countermeasures.